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LAY WITNESS OPINION TESTIMONY ON MENTAL STATE & 
DEPRESSION: A CALL FOR REFORM 
Adam Santeusanio* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’ section on 
“depressive disorders” recognizes eight subcategories of disorders.1 Depres-
sive disorders are caused by an array of environmental, genetic, and physio-
logical factors, and symptoms of depression can range from “feelings of 
worthlessness” to psychomotor retardation and suicidal ideation.2 Major 
depressive disorder is associated with “hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis 
hyperactivity,” and Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) studies have linked 
the disease with “functional abnormalities in specific neural systems sup-
porting emotion procession, reward seeking, and emotion regulation.”3 Med-
ical professionals commonly treat depression with both psychotherapy and 
psychoactive medications, the most common category of which affects how 
the brain processes the neurotransmitter serotonin.4 Though each depressive 
disorder has different causes and presentations, all depressive disorders are 
characterized by “somatic and cognitive changes that significantly affect the 
individual’s capacity to function.”5 
In the medical community, the term “depression” refers to a clinical 
psychological illness, which can severely and detrimentally impact an indi-
vidual’s mental and physical well-being.6 The general American public, 
however, has ascribed another meaning to the term “depressed,” which ef-
fectively renders the term “depressed” ambiguous.7 The average American 
most commonly uses the term “depressed” to refer not to the clinical psy-
 
    * B.A., University of Pittsburgh; J.D., Boston University School of Law; Litigation 
Associate, Conn, Kavanaugh, Rosenthal, Peisch & Ford LLP. I would like to state at the 
outset that I am not a medical professional, and have absolutely no medical training. Any 
facts or opinions in this essay concerning medical conditions are drawn from research, and 
appropriate citations are included. 
 1. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 155–88 (5th ed. 2013). 
 2. Id. at 161, 166. 
 3. Id. at 165. 
 4. See LLOYD I. SEDERER, THE FAMILY GUIDE TO MENTAL HEALTH CARE 98–104 
(2013). 
 5. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 1, at 155. 
 6. Sederer, supra note 4, at 93. 
 7. Id. 
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chological illness, but rather to transient feelings of sadness or disappoint-
ment.8 For example, Mark may comment to a co-worker that he is “de-
pressed” because the New England Patriots lost in the playoffs. When used 
in this sense, the term “depressed” does not refer to a medical condition, but 
rather to a transient feeling of sadness.9 When a witness testifying in court 
uses the term “depressed,” its ambiguity—as this essay will address at 
length—poses an important evidentiary issue. 
In the American legal system, the existence, or not, of a depressive dis-
order is crucial to determining a person’s mental state, mental capacity, and 
motive.10 Therefore, evidence concerning depression and its associated dis-
orders commonly plays a key role in the course of civil and criminal litiga-
tion. For example, courts have considered evidence of depression as relevant 
to whether a testator has the capacity to make a will.11 Courts also consider 
evidence of depression in cases where an insurer disputes an insured’s cause 
of death.12 In other cases, courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover damages 
for depression caused by a defendant’s negligent or intentional actions.13 
Perhaps most importantly, a party may elicit witness testimony that another 
 
 8. See id. 
 9. Unless specifically stated otherwise, the terms “depressed” and “depression,” when 
used in this essay, refer to the clinical psychological condition, not to general “sadness” or 
“disappointment.” 
 10. See infra notes 11-14. 
 11. See, e.g., Kelley v. First State Bank of Princeton, 401 N.E.2d 247, 255 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1980) (holding that a testator suffering from depression and impaired cognitive capacity 
lacked the capacity to create a will); Maimonides School v. Coles, 881 N.E.2d 778, 789 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (finding that, while “depression does not per se negate the testator’s 
mental capacity,” evidence of depression is relevant to evaluating capacity); In re Will of 
Priddy, 614 S.E.2d 454, 457 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (finding a genuine issue of material fact as 
to testamentary capacity where the testator was depressed); In re Estate of Blakes, 104 
S.W.3d 333, 336–37 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the testator lacked capacity to make a 
will where he suffered from depression, pain, and other physical ailments). 
 12. Green v. William Penn Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 902 N.Y.S.2d 542, 546–51 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2010) (considering evidence of depression to determine whether insured committed 
suicide); Dixon v. United Illuminating Co., 748 A.2d 300, 301–02 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) 
(weighing evidence of depression against evidence of a pre-existing work injury to determine 
the cause of the claimant’s suicide); Bickford v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 317 A.2d 573, 575 
(N.H. 1974) (considering evidence of decedent’s depression to determine if the decedent 
committed suicide). 
 13. Pinkham v. Burgess, 933 F.2d 1066, 1070 (1st Cir. 1991) (permitting the plaintiff to 
recover damages for emotional distress where the defendant’s professional malpractice 
caused the plaintiff to suffer from severe depression);Nelsen v. Research Corp. of Univ. of 
Haw., 805 F. Supp. 837, 848 (D. Haw. 1992) (allowing a plaintiff to recover damages under 
the Jones Act for depression caused by the defendant’s negligence in providing an unseawor-
thy vessel); Wrenn v. Byrd, 464 S.E.2d 89, 92 (N.C. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that depression 
can constitute “severe emotional distress” for purposes of a negligent infliction of emotional 
distress claim). 
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party is “depressed” in order provide a motive or a “story line” to explain 
why the party took a particular action or behaved a certain way.14 
In light of the complexity, severity, and pervasiveness of depressive 
disorders, as well as the key intersections between depression and the law, 
the federal judiciary’s approach towards lay opinion testimony concerning 
depression is somewhat surprising. Federal Rule of Evidence 701 governs 
the admissibility of lay witness opinion testimony, and carefully circum-
scribes the admissibility of lay witness opinion testimony in several im-
portant respects.15 In particular, Rule 701 prohibits a lay witness from offer-
ing opinion testimony where the opinion is based on “scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge.”16 In Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Trust of 
Chicago, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held 
that, under Rule 701, a lay witness—with no medical background, training, 
or experience—could testify that in her opinion the defendant was “very 
depressed,” over the defendant’s objection.17 The court reasoned that, 
“[w]hile ‘depressed’ does have a medical definition, a reasonable jury can 
be expected to understand the difference between lay use of an adjective and 
an expert’s use of the same word to describe a specific psychological condi-
tion.”18 The federal courts are not alone in this approach. In the majority of 
American jurisdictions, a lay witness who had the opportunity to interact 
with a person can give opinion testimony as to whether that person is de-
pressed.19 
 
 14. This practice is particularly common in the criminal context, for example, where a 
prosecutor elicits testimony that a defendant is depressed in order to prove that the defendant 
was capable of committing an egregious crime. See State v. DePiano, 926 P.2d 508, 513 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). For example, in State v. DePiano, the State of Arizona charged the 
defendant with child abuse for locking herself “and her [two] sons in defendant’s car, with 
the engine running, in the garage.” Id. at 510. At trial, the prosecution’s main tact was to 
paint the defendant as depressed and suicidal, in order to convince the jury that the defendant 
committed the acts of child abuse as part of a plan to kill herself and her children. Id. at 513. 
The State v. DePiano case appears to follow a pattern that is common among filicide prosecu-
tions. See, e.g., Rebecca Leung, Part 2: Mother Tried for Murder, CBS NEWS (Feb. 5, 2002), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/part-2-mother-tried-for-murder/ (discussing another prosecu-
tion for filicide where the prosecution alleged depression as a key motive for the defendant’s 
actions). 
 15. See generally FED. R. EVID. 701. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Trust of Chi., 433 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 18. Id. at 565. 
 19. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-109 (2015) (“In any trial or hearing in which the mental 
condition of the defendant is an issue, witnesses not specifically trained in psychiatry or 
psychology . . . shall be permitted to give their opinions or conclusions concerning the mental 
condition of the defendant.”); Phillips v. State, 739 S.W.2d 688, 689–90 (Ark. 1987) (“We 
have held in an unbroken line of cases extending back for decades that a lay witness can 
testify to an opinion as to the competency of another if he or she has had an adequate basis 
for forming an opinion.”); Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) 
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This essay will argue that the federal courts should reject the Farfaras 
approach, which allows lay witnesses to offer opinion testimony that a per-
son is depressed, and instead adopt a rule whereby: (1) qualified experts 
under Rule 702, and only qualified experts, can testify concerning whether a 
person meets the clinical criteria for a depressive disorder; and (2) lay wit-
nesses may testify to a person’s appearance, behavioral patterns, and de-
meanor, or to any other facts observed about the person, but cannot offer the 
opinion that a person is “depressed,” whether or not the lay witness is using 
the term “depressed” in a scientific or medical sense.20 
This essay will present three main arguments against the current federal 
standard. First, the Farfaras Court erred in endorsing the societal misuse of 
the term “depression,” and instead should have held that the term “depres-
sion” refers only to the clinical psychological illness, not to general feelings 
of sadness. If the federal judiciary takes the stance that the term “depres-
sion” refers only to the clinical psychological illness, then pursuant to Rule 
701 a lay witness would be prohibited from offering her opinion—which 
would essentially amount to a medical diagnosis—on whether a person is 
depressed. Second, allowing lay witnesses to speculate about whether a per-
son is depressed does not aid the jury in finding the facts, and in fact may 
cause a substantial amount of juror confusion. Third, from a public policy 
perspective, it is unfair to litigants to allow untrained lay witnesses to specu-
 
(holding that a “lay witness may testify as to his opinion that an individual is legally insane” 
if the opinion is “based on the personal observations or experiences of the witness”); Leba-
non Cty. Hous. Auth. v. Landeck, 967 A.2d 1009, 1016 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (holding that 
the trial court erred as a matter of law by not permitting a lay witness to give his opinion that 
the plaintiff was depressed); State v. Pittman, No. 02-1318, 2004 WL 355886, at *2–3 (Iowa 
Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2004) (allowing prosecution witnesses to testify to whether the victim was 
depressed before her death); see also People v. Hulitt, No. 1-09-2595, 2012 WL 6935609, at 
*2 (Ill. App. Ct. June 18, 2012) (holding that expert testimony concerning the defendant’s 
mental condition was “unnecessary because defendant’s circumstances at the time of the 
victim’s death were such that a jury would be more than capable of determining, based upon 
common knowledge, whether defendant was depressed”). 
 20. As this essay will address in Part IV, Massachusetts has already adopted a similar 
approach. See MASS. GUIDE TO EVID. § 701 (2015); Commonwealth v. Sliech-Brodeur, 930 
N.E.2d 91, 114 n.43 (Mass. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Monico, 488 N.E.2d 1168, 
1175 (Mass. 1986)) (“Although a lay witness may not testify about whether another person 
suffered from mental illness, such a witness is permitted to ‘testify to facts observed.’”). Of 
course, if the person the witness is testifying about personally told the witness that he or she 
felt depressed, the witness could likely testify to that statement under Rule 801 or Rule 803. 
See FED. R. EVID. 801 (defining certain categories of statements as admissible non-hearsay); 
FED. R. EVID. 803 (establishing an exception to the rule against hearsay for statements con-
cerning “the declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or emo-
tional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health)”). This 
essay is merely concerned about the common practice of allowing lay witnesses—who have 
no medical training and often limited experience interacting with the person—to speculate on 
the witness stand during a live trial as to whether a person is depressed. 
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late in open court about whether a litigant is depressed. Finally, this essay 
will consider the consequences of adopting the alternative rule proposed 
above, and conclude that the alternative approach preserves the ability of 
witnesses to testify accurately and descriptively while on the witness stand, 
while avoiding juror confusion and protecting parties to the litigation. 
This essay will proceed as follows. Part II of this essay contains back-
ground information on Rule 701 and the rationale behind the Farfaras deci-
sion. Part III contains the main analysis section, and will argue against the 
current federal practice of allowing lay witnesses to testify that a person is 
“depressed.” Part IV presents an alternative approach to lay witness testi-
mony on depression, and discusses some reasons for favoring such an ap-
proach. Part V provides a conclusion. 
II. BACKGROUND: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 701-702 & THE FARFARAS 
DECISION 
To understand the flaws in the Farfaras decision and its reasoning, one 
must first understand the applicable rules of evidence and the Farfaras deci-
sion itself. Section II.A discusses Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and 702, 
the evidentiary rules that establish the boundaries of lay and expert testimo-
ny. Section II.B discusses the Farfaras opinion, which allows lay witnesses 
to offer opinion testimony that a person is depressed. 
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 701 & 702 
The Farfaras decision can only be understood in the context of Rule 
701 and Rule 702—the evidentiary rules that delineate the boundaries of lay 
and expert testimony.21 Rule 701, in its entirety, states: 
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an 
opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s per-
ception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or 
to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
22
 
If a witness’s opinion testimony is based on scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge, the witness must be qualified as an expert to 
state the opinion.23 Otherwise, the federal rules preclude her from testifying 
 
 21. See FED. R. EVID. 701; FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Anne Bowen Poulin, Experience-
Based Opinion Testimony: Strengthening the Lay Opinion Rule, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 551, 556–
57 (2012) (discussing the line between lay opinion testimony and expert testimony). 
 22. FED. R. EVID. 701. 
 23. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (“Under the 
[2000] amendment, a witness’s testimony must be scrutinized under the rules regulating 
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to the opinion.24 Under Rule 702, a court may qualify a witness as an “expert 
witness” on a particular topic, but only if certain conditions are met.25 Once 
qualified as an expert witness, the expert is permitted to share her opinions 
on the particular topic of her expertise.26 
The overarching purpose of Rule 701 is to “put[] the trier of fact in 
possession of an accurate reproduction of the event” being litigated.27 In 
effect, Rule 701 is a compromise. It allows lay witnesses to testify to certain 
opinions, but only in order “to express information that cannot be conveyed 
through a bare factual account”28 or to describe “an endless number of items 
that cannot be described factually in words apart from inferences.”29 For 
example, a lay witness can testify to her opinion that “the room was dark,” 
or that “the defendant appeared to be 6 foot 5 inches tall,” or that “the victim 
appeared frightened.”30 The federal rules recognize that opinions of this na-
ture are necessary to a live-testimony-based adversarial system, lest jurors 
be forced to endure a witness’s attempt to describe the reaction of “fright” 
solely based on objective facts.31 However, where the opinion is based on 
“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,” the opinion enters 
the province of expert testimony, and a layperson cannot testify concerning 
the opinion.32 The following section discusses the Farfaras decision. 
B. The Farfaras Decision 
The Farfaras case arose out of an employment dispute between the 
plaintiff, Jennifer Farfaras (“Farfaras”), and the defendants, Citizens Bank 
 
expert opinion to the extent that the witness is providing testimony based on scientific, tech-
nical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”). 
 24. Id. 
 25. FED. R. EVID. 702. An expert witness may testify in the form of an opinion when the 
following conditions are met: 
(a) the experts scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the tes-
timony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of re-
liable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the princi-
ples and methods to the facts of the case. 
Id. 
 26. See id. This general rule is of course subject to other limitations set forth in the fed-
eral rules. See id. (setting forth conditions on expert witness opinion testimony); FED. R. 
EVID. 704 (limiting the admissibility of expert opinions on “ultimate issues”). 
 27. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rule. 
 28. Poulin, supra note 21, at 564. 
 29. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment to rule. 
 30. See id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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and Trust of Chicago (“Bank”) and several of its employees.33 Farfaras al-
leged assault, battery, sex discrimination, and sexual harassment claims 
against the Bank and its employees.34 At trial, one of the disputed issues was 
the extent of Farfaras’s “emotional distress” damages.35 Farfaras called her 
friend Yonia Yonan (“Yonan”) to testify to Farfaras’s emotional distress, 
and Yonan testified that, as a result of her treatment by the defendants, Far-
faras had become “very depressed.”36 Farfaras had never in fact “consulted 
a[ny] medical professional about her unhappiness.”37 The district court over-
ruled the defendant’s objection to Yonan’s use of the word “depressed,” and 
ultimately, the jury awarded Farfaras over $350,000 in damages for loss of 
dignity, humiliation, emotional distress, and pain and suffering.38 
The defendants appealed the district court decision, and argued on ap-
peal that “the district court improperly allowed Yonia Yonan, a layperson, to 
describe Farfaras’s mental condition as ‘depressed.’”39 On appeal, the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding with regard to Yonan’s 
testimony, and held that the testimony was proper lay opinion testimony 
within the bounds of Rule 701.40 The Seventh Circuit emphasized that there 
was “nothing in the record to indicate [that] the jury would have believed 
Yonan was offering a clinical opinion or professional evaluation” of Far-
faras’s mental health.41 Citing to Rule 701, the court determined that Yo-
nan’s testimony was “rationally based on [her] perception of [Farfaras] . . . 
and not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within 
the scope of Rule 702.”42 Though the Seventh Circuit recognized that “‘de-
pressed’ does have a medical definition,” the court ultimately held that “a 
reasonable jury [could] be expected to understand the difference between 
lay use of an adjective and an expert’s use of the same word to describe a 
specific psychological condition.”43 
 
 33. Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Trust of Chi., 433 F.3d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 563–64. 
 36. Id. at 563. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 563–64. 
 39. Farfaras, 433 F.3d at 565. 
 40. See id. at 570. 
 41. Id. at 565. The court here is likely referencing a line of cases which held that, when a 
treating physician or medical specialist testifies concerning the “diagnosis and causation” of a 
patient’s “depression or other mental condition,” the physician or specialist must be qualified 
as an expert under Rule 702, and cannot offer opinions on diagnosis and causation as a lay 
witness. See Ferris v. Pa. Fed’n Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 736, 746 (E.D. 
Pa. 2001); Hahn v. Minn. Beef Indus., Inc., No. Civ.002282, 2002 WL 32658476, at *3 (D. 
Minn. 2002); Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1097–98 (Colo. 2007). 
 42. Farfaras, 433 F.3d at 565. 
 43. Id. 
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In essence, the court in Farfaras held that a layperson can offer opinion 
testimony in the form of a conclusion that a person is or is not depressed 
where the opinion does not appear to be a “clinical opinion” or “professional 
evaluation.”44 In so holding, the court delegitimizes a serious mental illness 
and violates basic principles that our evidentiary rules and adversarial sys-
tem are designed to promote.45 The rest of this essay addresses the short-
comings of the Farfaras decision. 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE FARFARAS HOLDING 
The Farfaras decision should be overturned because: (1) it creates lo-
gistical hurdles and delegitimizes depression; (2) it leads to juror confusion 
and the admission of non-probative evidence; and (3) it is contrary to sound 
public policy. The following sections discuss each issue in turn. 
A. The Term “Depression” should be Confined to its Medical Definition 
When Used by a Testifying Expert Witness 
Section III.A proceeds in two steps. First, Section III.A.1 discusses the 
Farfaras court’s endorsement of the societal misuse of the term “depres-
sion,” and concludes that the term should be limited to its medical defini-
tion. Second, Section III.A.2 argues that, if the term “depression” is limited 
to its medical definition, Rule 701 would prohibit a lay witness from testify-
ing to whether a person is depressed. 
1. The Farfaras Holding Creates Logistical Problems & Delegiti-
mizes Depression 
In Farfaras, the court relies on the notion that the term “depression” 
has two meanings.46 First, a witness may use the term “depressed” to suggest 
that a person is generally sad or upset.47 Alternatively, a witness can use the 
term “depressed” to refer to the specific psychological condition.48 Despite 
 
 44. See id. at 565–66. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Id. at 565 n.1 (“A jury is capable of differentiating between the general definition 
‘low in spirits’ and the more specific [definition] that involves psychological expertise.”). 
 47. See id. 
 48. Farfaras, 433 F.3d at 565. Notably, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit made the bizarre decision to cite to Webster’s dictionary—an English language 
dictionary—to prove that “depressed” has more than one meaning. Id. The court explained 
that Webster’s defines “depressed” both as “low in spirits” and “affected by psychological 
depression.” Id. at 565 n.1. This argument completely misses the point. The term “depressed” 
has undoubtedly been widely misused by the general population to refer to general feelings of 
sadness. See Sederer, supra note 4, at 93. That, however, is completely irrelevant to whether 
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hinging its holding on this distinction, the Seventh Circuit fails to explain 
how jurors and judges should decide which definition of depressed a witness 
is testifying to.49 In light of the fact that substantial emotional distress dam-
ages were at stake in the case, it would seem inexpedient for the court to 
assume that the jury could simply intuit which meaning of “depressed” the 
witness intended. In a criminal case, where the defendant’s life and liberty is 
at stake, allowing a jury to speculate about which meaning of “depressed” a 
witness intended could have more severe consequences. The Farfaras hold-
ing raises an unnecessary logistical question: how, exactly, are juries to de-
termine which meaning of “depressed” the witness intended? 
Logistical issues aside, the Farfaras court’s willingness to embrace the 
societal misuse of the term “depression” represents an unfortunate judicial 
approval of American society’s continual delegitimization of psychological 
conditions.50 Dr. Lloyd I. Sederer opines on this phenomenon in his book 
The Family Guide to Mental Health Care: 
Unfortunately, “depression” has become an umbrella term for much of 
what ails (or even just upsets) us. People throw around the term “de-
pressed” as if it has no clinical meaning at all. They are “depressed” after 
seeing a sad movie or “depressed” because the dry cleaner closed before 
they could get there. But depression is different from a bad day, or dis-
appointment, or grief. Major depression is a disease, with hallmark 
symptoms, a clinical course, and dangers; it should not be confused with 
everyday stress, or minimized in its gravity.
51
 
In American society, mental illness is trivialized on a daily basis by the 
use of incorrect and offensive terminology.52 A forgetful person is a 
 
a lay witness should be permitted to share her opinion on whether someone is depressed in a 
court of law. As further discussed below, the American public has misused and misapplied a 
wide range or psychological and medical terms. See infra notes 49–56 and accompanying 
text. However, just because a layperson misuses a term in his everyday life does not—or 
should not—mean that he may enter a courtroom and misuse that same term. By citing to an 
English language dictionary to retrieve the definition of a medical term, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suggests that, if a term is misused widely enough 
that the misuse makes it into the dictionary, laypersons can then misuse that medical term in a 
court of law. 
 49. See Farfaras, 433 F.3d at 565. 
 50. See Sederer, supra note 4, at 93. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Arthur Gallant, Is the Way You Speak About Mental Illness Offensive?, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Aug. 16, 2012, 5:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/Arthur-gallant/mental-health-
terms_terms_b_1787156.html; Gary Nunn, Time to Change the Language We Use About 
Mental Health, GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2014, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/mind-your-language/2014/feb/28/mind-your-language-
mental-health. 
486 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
“schizo.”53 An eccentric person is a “psycho” or “insane.”54 A moody person 
is “bipolar.” American society seems to have acknowledged, only very re-
cently, that the term “retarded” is offensive, though use of the term contin-
ues unabated.55 The American public has ascribed a colloquial meaning to 
each one of these terms, with the results being, in almost every instance, 
highly offensive.56 The Seventh Circuit’s holding that the term “depression” 
can refer to “everyday sadness” delegitimizes and trivializes a severe and 
pervasive mental illness, and further ingrains the societal misuse of “depres-
sion” into the American language.57 The federal judiciary is, of course, not 
responsible for policing the linguistic habits of American society. However, 
it should be responsible for ensuring that witnesses testifying in its own 
courtrooms refrain from using terms that delegitimize and actively mock 
mental illnesses. 
2. Rule 701 Prohibits a Lay Witness from Diagnosing “Depression” 
Properly Defined 
If, then, the federal judiciary takes the stance that the term “depression” 
refers only to the specific psychological condition, what are the consequenc-
es under the Federal Rules of Evidence? As discussed above, Rule 701 pro-
hibits a lay witness from offering an opinion that is based on “scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”58 
To offer an opinion based on “scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge,” the witness must be qualified as an expert witness under Rule 
702.59 Consistent with Rule 701, a lay witness could offer opinion testimony 
that a person is generally sad or upset because such an opinion does not re-
quire “scientific” or “technical” knowledge.60 However, if the term “depres-
sion” were limited to its clinical psychological definition, a witness would 
be offering a medical diagnosis by offering an opinion on whether a person 
is depressed.61 An opinion concerning a medical diagnosis requires a wealth 
of scientific, technical, and specialized knowledge, and is well beyond the 
 
 53. Gallant, supra note 52. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Perhaps surprisingly, this term is still used by more than just schoolchildren on the 
playground. During the 2012 election, after a debate between Mitt Romney and Barack 
Obama, Ann Coulter tweeted that Obama was a “retard.” Emanuella Grinberg, Ann Coulter’s 
Backward Use of the ‘R-Word’, CNN (Oct. 24, 2012, 8:06 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/23/living/ann-coulter-obama-tweet/. 
 56. See generally Gallant, supra note 52. 
 57. See Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Trust of Chi., 433 F.3d 558, 565 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 58. FED. R. EVID. 701. 
 59. See id.; FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 60. See FED. R. EVID. 701. 
 61. See id. 
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ken of any layperson untrained in the practice of medicine.62 In fact, courts 
nearly uniformly hold that opinions concerning medical diagnoses must be 
offered by qualified experts, and are inadmissible if offered by lay witness-
es.63 Therefore, if the federal judiciary took the stance that the term “depres-
sion” refers only to the clinical psychological illness, then pursuant to Rule 
701 a lay witness would be prohibited from offering her opinion—which 
would essentially amount to a diagnosis—on whether a person suffers from 
depression.64 
B. The Farfaras Holding Admits Non-Probative Evidence that is Confus-
ing to Jurors 
The Farfaras holding allows lay witnesses to offer opinion testimony 
on whether a person is “depressed,” and thereby opens the floodgates for a 
range of non-probative, confusing testimony to be presented to the jury. 
Consider, for example, the case of People v. Gindorf.65 In Gindorf, the 
State of Illinois charged the defendant with intentionally murdering her two 
children by feeding them an overdose of Unisom tablets.66 The defendant 
confessed that she was guilty to the police, and the key issue at trial was 
whether the defendant was sane at the time of the murders.67 One witness at 
trial—the defendant’s neighbor—drove the defendant to the store (unknow-
ingly) to buy the sleeping pills, which the defendant used hours later to 
commit the crime.68 That neighbor testified that the defendant was “normal 
and was not depressed.”69 A different neighbor testified that the defendant 
seemed depressed around the time of the murders.70 The defendant then 
called a clinical psychologist to testify that “persons afflicted with major 
depression can appear normal to lay people.”71 By admitting the lay opinion 
testimony on whether the defendant was depressed, the court presented the 
jury with a morass of confusing and unhelpful testimony to sort through.72 
Though it is undoubtedly the province of the jury to sort through conflicting 
 
 62. See, e.g., Montoya v. Sheldon, 286 F.R.D. 602, 614 (D.N.M. 2012) (“A treating 
physician’s opinions regarding diagnosis of a medical condition is almost always expert 
testimony, because diagnosis requires judgment based on scientific, technical, or specialized 
knowledge in almost every case.”). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See FED. R. EVID. 701. 
 65. 512 N.E.2d 770 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). 
 66. Id. at 771–72. 
 67. Id. at 772. 
 68. Id. at 773. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Gindorf, 512 N.E.2d at 774. 
 72. See id. at 773–74. 
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testimony, the jury should not be required to do so when the conflicting tes-
timony is not probative towards resolving disputed factual issues.73 The 
Gindorf case is a simple, yet striking example of the juror confusion that 
results when lay witnesses are permitted to testify using medical terms like 
“depression.” 
C. The Farfaras Holding is Contrary to Public Policy 
The Farfaras holding is contrary to public policy because it: (1) allows 
litigants to put non-probative, potentially prejudicial evidence to the jury, 
thereby diminishing access to fair trials; and (2) subjects litigants to un-
founded speculation, in open court, about sensitive matters relating to men-
tal health. The following subsections address each issue in turn.  
1. Evidence Concerning Depression can be Highly Prejudicial 
Regardless of whether used to refer to a specific medical condition or 
to “everyday sadness,” the term “depression” can be highly prejudicial, and 
thereby obstruct access to fair trials. In the United States, the public percep-
tion of persons with mental disorders is driven by twenty-four-hour news 
coverage of murders and other violent crimes.74 Many of the most high-
profile crimes in recent memory—for example, the Columbine shooting,75 
the Aurora theater shooting,76 and the Virginia Tech shooting77—were 
committed by persons with highly publicized depressive disorders. 
The media cycle has fostered an American public that has vastly dis-
torted opinions concerning violence and mental illness.78 A national survey 
 
 73. This general principle is embodied in Rule 403. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (permitting 
the exclusion of evidence if the evidence’s probative value is “substantially outweighed” by 
the danger of confusing or misleading the jury). 
 74. Heather Stuart, Violence and Mental Illness: An Overview, WORLD PSYCHIATRY 
ASSOCIATION (June 2, 2003), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1525086. 
 75. Dave Cullen, The Depressive and the Psychopath, SLATE (Apr. 20, 2004, 11:59 
AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/assessment/2004/04/the_depressive_and_th
e_psychopath.html. 
 76. James Holmes ill, Depressed Months Before Attack, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 29, 
2015, 2:13 PM), http://www.9news.com/story/news/local/aurora-theater-trial/2015/05/29/ 
james-holmes-interview-family-faith/28154185/. 
 77. Emily Friedman, Va. Tech Shooter Seung-Hui Cho’s Mental Health Records Re-
leased, ABC NEWS (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.abcnews.go.com/US/seung-hui-chos-
mental-health-records-released/story?id=8278195. 
 78. See Mental Illness and Violence, HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL (Jan. 1, 2011), 
http://www.health.harvard.edu/newsletter_article/mental-illness-and-violence (“In fact, re-
search suggests that this public perception does not reflect reality. Most individuals with 
psychiatric disorders are not violent.”); Stuart, supra note 74 (“Similarly, [the respondents to 
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conducted in 2006 found that thirty-two percent of people thought that per-
sons with major depression were “likely to act violently toward someone 
else.”79 Other studies have shown that the general public believes that per-
sons suffering from mental illness are “dangerous” and “unpredictable.”80 
Of course, the average American jury likely will bring these predispo-
sitions and perceptions with them into the jury room, and determine guilt 
and innocence based on both trial testimony and their background 
knowledge of human interactions and behavior, regardless of how distorted 
these perceptions may be. Therefore, a jury should only be presented with 
evidence that someone is “depressed” if that evidence comes from a medical 
expert who is actually qualified to testify to whether the person’s symptoms 
are consistent with the established clinical criteria for the condition.81 
2. Lay Opinion Testimony Concerning Depression is Unfair to Liti-
gants 
Lay opinion testimony concerning a party’s mental health also subjects 
litigants to unfounded speculation, in open court, about sensitive matters 
relating to their mental health. Health related matters are, for various rea-
sons, often very personal to people. Considering the substantial stigma asso-
ciated with mental health,82 it is reasonable to assume that many litigants 
would prefer, if possible, to leave speculation about their mental health out 
of the courtroom. Obviously, this cannot always be accomplished, because 
as discussed throughout this essay, mental health is often a key issue at tri-
 
the survey] significantly overestimated the risk of violence among schizophrenia and depres-
sion.”); Jillian K. Peterson, How Often and How Consistently Do Symptoms Directly Precede 
Criminal Behavior Among Offenders with Mental Illness?, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 439 
(2014) (finding that “psychiatric symptoms relate weakly to criminal behavior at the group 
level”). 
 79. Mental Illness and Violence, supra note 78. 
 80. Bruce G. Link et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness: Labels, Causes, Danger-
ousness, and Social Distance, 89 AM. JUR. PUB. HEALTH 1328, 1328 (1999). 
 81. Of course, even under the alternative rule proposed in this essay, jurors will still take 
their misconceptions concerning depression into the jury room in cases where an expert testi-
fies that a person is depressed. However, by limiting the number of trials where the term 
“depression” is loosely thrown around by lawyers and witnesses, the federal judiciary could 
drastically limit the number of cases in which juror misconceptions about depression have an 
effect on the outcome. Moreover, in cases where an expert testifies concerning a person’s 
mental state, the expert can provide in-depth testimony concerning the person’s actual symp-
toms or perhaps even general opinion evidence concerning the intersection between depres-
sion and violence, which would help stem the general misconception that all depressed per-
sons are “dangerous” and “unpredictable.” 
 82. See Peter Byrne, Stigma of Mental Illness and Ways of Diminishing It, 6 ADVANCES 
IN PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 65, 65 (2000) (“The stigma of mental illness, although more 
often related to context than to a person’s appearance, remains a powerful negative attribute 
in all social relations.”). 
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al.83 Therefore, where witness testimony concerning depression is required, 
the best rule in terms of fairness to litigants is to forbid lay witnesses from 
sharing speculative and unfounded opinions about depression, and allow 
only qualified experts in a relevant medical field to share such opinions. 
As Part III has demonstrated, the Farfaras holding is problematic. It 
created a rule that delegitimizes depression, confuses and misleads jurors, 
and is contrary to sound public policy. The following Part discusses an al-
ternative to the Farfaras court’s approach, which avoids the problems posed 
by the Farfaras decision and provides several additional benefits. 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE FARFARAS RULE 
Rather than adhere to the Farfaras rule, the federal judiciary should 
adopt an alternative approach whereby: (1) qualified experts under Rule 
702, and only qualified experts, can testify concerning whether a person 
meets the clinical criteria for a depressive disorder; and (2) lay witnesses 
may testify to a person’s appearance, behavioral patterns, and demeanor, as 
well as to any other facts observed about the person, but cannot offer the 
opinion that a person is “depressed,” whether or not the lay witness is using 
the term “depressed” in a scientific or medical sense.84 The benefits of such 
a rule are readily apparent. 
First, the alternative approach allows witnesses to present a rich and 
detailed account of a person’s mental state, thereby providing the trier of 
fact with all of the information she needs in order to find the pertinent facts, 
while avoiding the juror bias and prejudice that may result from use of the 
term “depressed.” As the advisory committee’s note to Rule 701 explains, 
“the detailed account carries more conviction than the broad assertion.”85 
The advisory committee is suggesting that conclusory opinions about an 
event are not as persuasive or helpful to the jury as a detailed factual ac-
count of the event.86 This is precisely the premise the alternative approach 
relies on.87 Under the alternative approach, a witness could still testify to the 
following statements: “Tom appeared sad,” “Nancy stopped coming out to 
bars with us on Friday nights and typically just stayed in her apartment,” 
“John stopped saying hello to me in the mornings,” “I noticed that Jordan 
 
 83. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text. 
 84. Massachusetts has already adopted a similar approach. See MASS. GUIDE TO EVID. § 
701 (2015); Commonwealth v. Sliech-Brodeur, 930 N.E.2d 91, 114 n.43 (Mass. 2010) (quot-
ing Commonwealth v. Monico, 488 N.E.2d 1168, 1175 (Mass. 1986)) (“Although a lay wit-
ness may not testify about whether another person suffered from mental illness, such a wit-
ness is permitted to ‘testify to facts observed.’”). 
 85. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. 
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began drinking more heavily than she previously had,” “I rarely saw Nate 
smile during the month of December,” “Steve became angry at the smallest 
slight.”88 In effect, under the alternative approach, a witness could still testi-
fy to every aspect of a person’s appearance, demeanor, behavior, and tem-
perament. The alternative approach merely excludes lay witnesses from us-
ing the prejudicial and ambiguous term “depressed” on the witness stand. Of 
course, where a person’s mental state is crucial to the case, litigants will 
always have the option of qualifying an expert to share her expert opinion 
on depressive disorders and conditions.89 
Second, the alternative approach minimizes jury confusion. The Far-
faras rule rests on the presumption that “a reasonable jury [could] be ex-
pected to understand the difference between lay use of [the] adjective [‘de-
pressed’] and an expert’s use of the same word to describe a specific psy-
chological condition.”90 Undoubtedly, this will be true in some cases for 
some jurors, but in many cases lay witness use of the term “depressed” may 
simply confuse or mislead jurors. For example, a juror may hear a lay wit-
ness testify that a person was “depressed” and wonder whether the witness 
had knowledge that a medical professional clinically diagnosed the person 
with a depressive disorder. Others, on the same jury, may believe that there 
is no difference between the everyday “lay use” of “depression” and the 
clinical psychological condition, and assume that all depression is merely 
just “sadness.” Still other jurors may assume that the witness’s use of the 
term means that the person had a serious psychological condition, or alterna-
tively, that the person was “dangerous” and “unpredictable.”91 In contrast, 
the alternative approach avoids juror confusion, by ensuring that the term 
“depressed” is only used by qualified experts who can give jurors guidance 
on the particular depressive disorder at issue as well as its presentation and 
symptoms. 
Third, the Farfaras rule diminishes a severe, pervasive, and complex 
medical condition.92 The alternative approach recognizes that depression is a 
medical condition and that testimony concerning medical conditions is be-
yond the ken of the lay witness. 
Finally, the alternative approach avoids all of the problems raised by 
the Farfaras rule,93 and provides a workable alternative rule that comports 
with the language and purpose of Rules 701–702, as well as general princi-
ples of legal and public policy. 
 
 88. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee note. 
 89. See id.; FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 90. Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Trust of Chi., 433 F.3d 558, 565 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 91. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text. 
 92. See supra note 50–57 and accompanying text. 
 93. See supra notes 46–83 and accompanying text. 
492 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
V. CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence to aid courts in “ascer-
taining the truth and securing a just determination” of all litigated matters.94 
The Farfaras holding stands in opposition to the meaning and purpose of 
those rules, and violates basic principles of public policy that the American 
legal system should be committed to embracing.95 More importantly, the 
Farfaras holding represents an unfortunate judicial approval of the delegit-
imization of psychological conditions.96 In an era where, in many respects, 
American society has made impressive strides forward in its understanding 
of and relationship to psychological conditions, the Farfaras decision repre-
sents an unfortunate step backwards.97 Moreover, the Farfaras rule is patent-
ly unfair to litigants and diminishes access to fair and unprejudiced trials.98 
Conversely, the proposed alternative approach solves all of these problems, 
while ensuring that witness’ testimony—the essence of the American adver-
sarial system—can still paint a rich and detailed account of the events being 
litigated.99 Therefore, the Farfaras decision should be overturned, and the 
federal judiciary should adopt the proposed alternative approach to lay opin-
ion testimony concerning depression. 
 
 
 94. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 95. See supra notes 46–83 and accompanying text. 
 96. See supra notes 50–57 and accompanying text. 
 97. See Mark Anderson & Lynda Cannova, 50 Years of Mental Health Hope and Strug-
gle: 1957–2007, COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, http://www.crimeandjustice.org/councilinfo. 
cfm?pID=54. 
 98. See supra notes 74–83 and accompanying text. 
 99. See supra notes 84–93 and accompanying text. 
